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LANGUAGE,
IDENTITY AND
LIBERATION: A
CRITIQUE OF THE
TERM AND
CONCEPT "PEOPLE
OF COLOR"
By Elizam Escobar*
Any critical discussion on the question of identity
must remind us that the process of liberation is not only a
process of self-determination and power but also an inter-
nal process of self-examination. This internal process is
valid and important in and of itself, but when it is present
in the political/ideological struggle for liberation, it be-
comes crucial and qualitatively determinant.
Perhaps from a perspective of the excluded (los
excluidos) and their "experience with the law," it would
be beneficial to us all to comment on the implications of
the term/concept "people of color." At issue in this case
is their experience with the authority, "the law" of the
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Escobar has a B.A. in Fine Arts from the University of Puerto
Rico and pursued his studies at CUNY and the New York Art
Students' League. From 1974-78 he worked as a high school
teacher, and in 1979, as a visual artist with the Association of
Hispanic Arts and a teacher at the Museo del Barrio Art
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"dominant language" and discourse. This is an experience
that also reminds us of the complex relationship between
tongue,' language, discourse, and ideology.2
In this essay, I use the term language in a broad
sense. I do not conceive of it as a mere political-direct
instrumentality or as an "object of study" that belongs
exclusively to linguistics or any other academic discipline.
Language must be something alive - not a closed (dead)
system of signs. It is not equivalent to ideology either.
But even when tongue and language in themselves do not
belong to a specific class or sector of society, these class-
es or sectors - through oral and written discourse -
affect such matters as rhythm, meaning, terminology,
function or decisions on what is "correct" or "incorrect,"
"derogatory" or "affirmative."
When I talk about "the language of Power" or
"dominant language," I do so in a rather metaphorical,
non-linguistic sense; in the sense of what Power reveals to
us through its various discourses. On the other hand, "the
power of language" can either unveil to us or hide from
us that relationship that exists between ideological or lin-
1. A specific spoken language, such as English or Spanish,
as compared to language as a general system of signs.
2. Meschonnic, El lenguaje, el poder, 6 CUADERNOS DE
POn rlcA (Santo Domingo, 1985); Meschonnic, El marxismo
excluido del lenguaje, 7 CUADERNOS DE PoErTICA (Santo
Domingo, 1985).
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guistic sign and the real. We can either feel language as
prison or as liberation, or we can recognize that both
aspects of language are dialectically inseparable. We, the
periphery and excluded3 from dominant culture, must re-
sort to the power of language and discourse - but in the
most creative and radical way.
The power to name or to be named is also a part of
the class and ideological struggle. The former is, of
course, a highly political act, but as in any politics the
power of decision is not to be located in language itself
but in the people who use that language through their
discourses. It is, then, in the collective and individual
subject and through the multiplicity of discourses that
class and ideological struggle takes place. Though this
struggle between signs and discourses has a very abstract
nature, it also has a very concrete side when it deals with
one's collective or individual identity or self-esteem.
It is no surprise then that any attempt to
reconceptualize any old/new aspects of our reality, or to
criticize/problematize those "deep-rooted" class or individ-
ual prejudices that pass often as unquestionable scientific
truths or laws, will meet the most hostile resistance not
only from dominant ideology but from our own ranks as
well. This "intolerance" for difference in our own ranks is
many times unconscious. That is, it is so internalized that
we often do not realize how much we reproduce dominant
processes of ideology among ourselves. We function,
therefore, like terminals in a circulatory system of values,
beliefs, representations sent to us through all kinds of
signs and electronic/synthetic images. It is thus the task of
a radical discourse to always (the struggle never ends)
make these contradictions visible in order to resolve an-
tagonisms or to achieve a harmonious non-antagonist co-
existence among equals but with the right to be different,
the right to alteration and dissent.
However, difference can become a superficial pose,
an opportunistic way of taking advantage of one's "acci-
dental" features when there is no danger and when condi-
tions are in one's favor. The exploitation of one's race,
nationality, gender or culture for personal (moral or -mate-
rial) profit and prestige - this is difference as mere sta-
tus, difference for difference's sake.
In this dialectic of difference/sameness within our
ranks, sometimes one aspect demands the sacrifices of the
other. That is to say, individuality is sacrificed for
collectivity, or vice versa. Ideologism, which is the reduc-
tion of everything to ideology, demands one or the other
For example, if my discourse becomes problematic and
"difficult" among my ranks (my "equals," my "peers") I
might become suspect, stigmatized, alienated, In order .to
correct this "deviation" one has to adjust to the limits .of
the collectivity even when one might be ready to tran-
3. In "negative" terms, not only those who form part of
colonial and ex- neo- post- colonial histories in relation to
European colonial powers and United States imperialism (a.k.a.
First World, Occidental culture/civilization); but, today, also
those Third World peoples living in the First World ("internal
colonies"), and those groups or individuals who because of
race, nationality, culture, gender, sexual preferences or/and eth-
ical, political, artistic or ideological positions find themselves
..exiled" from mainstream society and culture.
scend those limits. Further, this means that liberation (or
freedom) stops where the dominant conception of "libera-
tion" within my ranks stops. The same thing can be said
about any dominated group or "minority" in relation to
the society (system) of which it forms part. Somehow,
this process is a "mimic," a duplication of the process of
consensus of dominant ideology, but it is always - here
and there - the powerless subject who suffers.
When a discourse springs from this lack of power
and abundance of pain, this discourse can end up in plain
personal or ideological resentment. But also, in the mea-
sure of its ethical and political commitment, and its signif-
icance, it can become a discourse of liberation in spite of
the limits of tongue, language and ideology. When passion
and concept find their dynamic unity there is a possibility
that a discourse might be able to express that which lan-
guage itself cannot express; or that which the thinking of
a certain moment has not yet been able to think.
The power to name or to be named is
also a part of the class and ideological
struggle.
Bearing this challenge and risk in mind, I approach
critically the term/concept "people of color" as it is cur-
rently used in the United States. In the United States,
dominant values, beliefs and representations of reality (i.e.
ideology) are those of the capitalist class, which, along
with the majority of the U.S. population, 4 is composed
almost exclusively of the so-called "white" race. The rest
of the population, the so-called "minorities," are referred
to as "non-whites." Only when matters get complicated, or
there are some political interests involved, do the domi-
nant agencies divide and subdivide "racial groups" to the
absurd. Sometimes it is difficult - if not impossible -
to know to which group one belongs.
The single most important feature used to classify
people in the United States is "color." People are classi-
fied by the "color" of their skin: Black, Brown, Red,
Yellow, etc. This is axiomatic, you may think, because we
all know this. But having this knowledge has not made
any difference in how the excluded ones and radi-
cal/progressive people approach the question of identity
and race most of the time. This approach never moves
beyond the "color/skin" fixation. This fixation has a long
tradition, and therefore, is difficult to break away from, to
the point that most terms used to generalize the amalgam
of "minorities" within the United States only reflect their'
dependence on dominant ideology. As a result, the evolu-
tion of the old term "colored people" to the "new" term
"people of color" remains within the "color/skin"
perspective. It seems to me, though, that before, "colored
people" referred mostly to "black" people; today, "people
4. Recent studies estimate that -at the beginning of the
twenty-first century the "minorities" within the U.S. will be-
come the "majority."
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of color" refers to all those who do not belong to the
"white" race. Still, this "new" form of the concept can
neither vindicate the new content within it (all the "minor-
ities" within the U.S.) nor the "old" term ("colored peo-
ple") simply because the new content overflows the form
of this reworded term/concept. Why? Because within the
Third World "minorities" in the U.S., the racial spectrum
(or "color" spectrum) includes all races and their mixtures,
all "colors," "shades," and "tones," including "white" and
"black" as "colors."
In this sense, "people of color" is a provincial term.
Not just because it is only used within the United States'
but because it could only have come into being in a soci-
ety like this. First, because "race" is still looked at from a
puritan Anglo-Saxon point of view: "blood purity" is
fetishized and "mixing" is taboo.6 And second, because
the United States is a modem Rome, it is the imperial(ist)
center where all kinds of displaced peoples (from this
hemisphere and other continents) usually end up. (It is
obvious that this is due not to a magical attraction, but to
a fatal one.) So, for better or worse, it is here where the
meeting of all racial, cultural, ethnic and national groups
takes place under the most antagonistic and ironic of
ways. This reunion of "differences" in relation to the
mainstream demands a new analysis and re-conceptualiza-
tion of the relations of forces. It also demands an effec-
tive economy of words, terms that can provide an easier
way of grasping this new agglomeration of peculiarities
and similarities. Hence, the "color/skin" fixation which is
part of the ideological circulatory system (which affects
all of us) "nationalizes" this otherwise extranational phe-
nomenon.
This provincial term - captive by dominant ideolo-
gy - reduces this phenomenon to only one of its compo-
nents: that of "race." It does not have the same political
immediacy and sense of other terms like "racial" or "na-
tional minorities," "oppressed nationalities" and "Third
5. In Puerto Rico, "person of color" refers, euphemistically,
to a person whose dominant facial features are "black"-African
(Western and Central Africa). This euphemism is characteristic
of our "psychological" form of racial prejudice, used by many
instead of "negro" to avoid "offense," though, paradoxically, in
Puerto Rico, as in other Latin American countries, "negro"
also means "dear" and "loved one." It would be interesting to
find out the origin of "persona de color" in Puerto Rico,
though I am almost certain it came about under U.S. colonial
domination.
6. Compared to the Anglo-Saxons and other North Europe-
an colonizers, the Spanish colonizers had a different "attitude"
toward the mixing between the races. The roots of these dif-
ferent racial/color/skin attitudes can be found in the different
historical development of these European peoples prior to the
colonization period of the Western Hemisphere, i.e. prior to
the fifteenth century.
This is not to say that the Spanish attitude toward race
and race mixing was "better." It was different. Maybe more
"flexible," subtle, hypocritical and psychological, and therefore
less visible; but the fact remains that the new socio-economic-
political orientations and ideologies brought by all European
colonizers were the beginning of developed "anachronistic"
slavery, and later on, of ideological and structural racism in
this hemisphere.
World peoples," which emerged in times of more militan-
cy.
7
For one, this term "people of color" has this fastidi-
ous "picturesque" element so familiar to the vocabulary of
tourism. It sounds like a color Polaroid photograph of
"nice" and "cute" people; innocent, inoffensive and do-
mesticated people, where everyone is homogenized with
this attribute of color. And who is this photographer who
has so carefully taken this picture? A "white" tourist with
"good intentions?" Or, in fact, is no one to be blamed but
ideology itself?
Furthermore, though it may seem inappropriate in
this essay to use the term color out of the racial context,
this might be helpful in order to unveil this intrinsic rela-
tionship between concept and term, and how, for example,
terms like "people of color" unconsciously reinforce preju-
diced and distorted concepts to classify people.
Rigorously speaking, color is something that depends
on light. Indeed, color itself is within light. It exists and it
does not exist. Can we say the same thing about races?
One thing is for sure: for most important matters, we do
not exist for mainstream society unless it is in the form
of a political token, a marketing product or domesticated
folklorization. Puerto Ricans only exist as "people of col-
or" to Anglo-America. Black is only that which proves
whiteness. And all dominated racial and national groups
exist first of all as "color," not as people. On the other
hand, it seems that the important question is not even
color per se but where color is located. That is, if "yel-
low" is located in the hair, it is good, very good; but if it
is located in the skin, then it is not as good.
But what if we use instead the term "colorless peo-
ple" to express our concept of the "white" dominant
class? I fear that this term would be considered "reverse
racism" or "anti-white." So a better solution would be to
say that all peoples are "people of color," that there are
no colorless people. In such a case, "color" is neither a
privilege nor a stigma, but a commonality.
Let us consider another perspective. While "people
of color" could be used with good or bad intentions, and
it could also be transformed from derogatory to affirma-
tive, as other terms have been, whose original intention
was insult, epithet, etc. (e.g. mulatto, Black, Chicano), it
is also true that we cannot advance our process of lib-
eration (today we are more self-conscious than previous
7. The term/concept "Third World" seems to have devel-
oped from the term "the third front," used by communists to
refer to colonial countries in relation to the struggle against
capitalism and imperialism.
8. One way of dealing with this is irony, especially in
literature, but also in the way an essay makes use of humor
to ironize or ridicule terms, concepts, values, beliefs, etc. that
mis-represent others. By doing this we make of the epithet a
"boomerang" or make the namer look at it in a mirror as
his/her own projection. Nevertheless, this is a weapon to dis-
mantle. As far as I can tell, "people of color" is not used in
an ironic way. Nor is its intention "metaphorical," but, to the
contrary, it is a very literal term/concept rooted in the way
dominant ideology in the U.S. perceives and understands "ra-
cial identity." Finally, and more importantly, even when this
term is not used in an ironic way, it paradoxically becomes
ironic in the sense that we ourselves help to reinforce what
palpitates behind it.
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generations about the importance of names, about who
exerts the power to name and why) if we do not simulta-
neously liberate our thought and our praxis from those
terms that have ceased to truly articulate or describe our
situation and understanding of our historical, cultural and
quotidian reality.
It is very self-defeating; both in, the short and in the
long term, to depend on these masters' "original" terms.
We must be original too, but in the true sense. Our ca-
pacity to survive, resist and finally win depends on our
capacity to be inventive. Originality is not to be under-
stood exclusively as mode, fashion or "the new." It is also
the necessary.
Thus, if we want to transform the pre-
dominant relations and world visions, we
must also transform this creature: condi-
tion, this reduction of people -to "color.
We must become creators, and cease to
be subjected to the other's fantasies and
myths.
Our dependency on our "masters' terminology has
ontological implications. The term "people of color" has a
dependent idiomatic discharge, i.e., its identity, its mean-
ing, depends .on another referent: "white" people. And
within this context, "white" becomes a code word for
"superior" or "original." We may resolve to explain this
as the nature of things when it comes to. the human con-
dition, but what we may not realize is that by perpetuat-
ing the use of such terms we are ironically reinforcing the
other term, "whiteness." We are saying: my race, my
nationality, my identity, my being, can only be defined in
relation to the "white". race. My "racial" being isa gift
from the other, the master. So in the same way that I am
a creature of social relations and the relations, between
ideological and linguistic signs, I am also a creature of
the dominant racial vision.
Thus, if we want to transform the predominant rela-
tions and world visions, we must also transform this crea-
ture condition, this reduction' of people to "color." We
must become creators, and cease to be subjected to the.
other's fantasies and myths. We must become the dream-'
ers and cease to be the dreamed ones, because in fact
transformation is a question not of "color" but of vision
and sensibility, both how we see and feel the world. It is
our (political, philosophical, ethical, aesthetic) vi-
sion/sensibility searching for its realization.
If we understand that the aspect of "color" is the
aspect imposed by the dominant vision to classify and
identify people, and we emphasize instead the cultural-
socio-economic-political aspects, which are the real vectors
conditioning our views on identity and race, what we are
saying is that we are forming a different criterion that can
better grasp our similarities but that can also simulta-
neously maintain our differences. A criterion that needs
and wants to "exorcise" itself from the old criterion; a
criterion that will make us recognize the objective,
concrete fact that we are now beyond "color/skin"
aberrations. This will be a criterion that unequivocally
points toward the roots of the problem: that Third World
people are discriminated against not only in terms of race,
but also in terms of class, gender, culture, and nationality.
Besides, when it comes to exclusion, hate, humiliation,
etc., of "minority" groups in the United States, the
dominant class, its institutions and repressive apparatuses
do not "discriminate."
For all these reasons, we must rethink this
term/concept "people of color" if we want to overcome
this subjection to mummified language. The quality of our
political action is determined by the quality of our politi-
cal vision and sensibility. To politicize our concepts and
terms inherited from the past, we must correct them with
the notions obtained through our irreducible experience of
reality and the political/social praxes. Of course, we can
only do this if we recognize that it is necessary, not in
order to please ourselves with "new" morphologies or
plastic surgeries trying to merely resolve real contradic-
tions through the means of language, but to make of lan-
guage a force capable of infusing energy and blood into
our discourse and movement.
The codes and language of Power, which otherwise
want to conquer my heart and yours, must be defetishized
by a language and discourse of liberation. That is, we
must do a lot of scraping, scratching and scrapping to do
away with this incantation.
To construct or re-construct our identity in terms of
difference we do not have to keep resorting to such inno-
cent and picturesque terms like "people of color." It is
preferable, in my opinion, to use the term "Third World
people" or "the excluded." We are in fact quasi-phantas-
magorical people reaching for our political being, in spite
of "color" and independently of nationality. Different, not
because of superficial features deeply rooted in the domi-
nant classes' prejudices,. but because we have a different
experience of reality.
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